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Abstract
Artemov, Kunimoto, and Serrano (2013a,b, henceforth, AKS) study a
mechanism design problem where arbitrary restrictions are placed on the set
of ﬁrst-order beliefs of agents. Calling these restrictions Δ, they adopt Δ-
rationalizability (Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2003)) and show that Δ-incentive
compatibility and Δ-measurability are necessary and suﬃcient conditions for
robust virtual implementation. By appropriately deﬁning Δ in order to re-
strict attention to complete information environments, I exploit the implica-
tions of AKS and show that the permissive implementation result of Abreu and
Matsushima (1992a) is robust to how the underlying type space is speciﬁed.
However, AKS need to ﬁx a complete information environment throughout
their analysis and therefore does not enable us to ask if robust virtual imple-
mentation results are “robust” to the relaxation of the complete information
environment. The main result of this paper shows that permissive robust vir-
tual implementation results can be extended to nearby incomplete information
environments.
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1 Introduction
The theory of implementation or mechanism design attempts to identify the
conditions under which a social choice rule may be decentralized through some
institution (or mechanism); that is, when agents, acting on their own self-
interest, can arrive at the outcomes prescribed by the social choice rule.1 This
paper addresses the question of full implementation, which requires that the
set of outcomes prescribed by a given solution concept coincide with the social
choice rule. Virtual implementation means that the planner contents him-
self with implementing the social choice rule with arbitrarily high probability.
This is an approximate version of exact implementation, which insists on im-
plementing the social choice rule with probability 1.
Typically, achieving a correct design of institutions depends on the knowl-
edge of key parameters in the environment and each agent privately possesses
some information about these parameters. An agent’s private information is
summarized by the notion of type. For an agent, a type speciﬁes (i) his private
information about his own preferences and/or the preferences of others (payoﬀ
type), (ii) his belief about the payoﬀ types of others (ﬁrst-order belief ), (iii) his
belief about others’ ﬁrst-order beliefs (second-order belief ), and so on, leading
to a hierarchy of beliefs ad inﬁnitum. A basic assumption of the classic ap-
proach to mechanism design is that the underlying spaces of types are common
knowledge among the planner and the agents. In making this assumption, one
eﬀectively assumes that each ﬁrst-order belief corresponds to a unique inﬁnite
hierarchy of beliefs.
This common-knowledge assumption is often seen as unrealistic. To make
their analysis robust to the speciﬁcation of higher-order beliefs, Artemov, Ku-
nimoto, and Serrano (2012a,b) (henceforth, AKS) use a type-free solution con-
cept of rationalizability – Δ-rationalizability (Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2003))
– that guarantees that the predictions are the same for any higher-order beliefs,
as long as those predictions are consistent with their Δ restriction on the ﬁrst-
order beliefs. Robust implementation is the requirement that implementation
survive any speciﬁcation of higher-order beliefs consistent with the common
knowledge structure of the environment (i.e., consistent with Δ-restriction).
AKS show that in quasi-transferable environments (soon to be deﬁned), a so-
cial choice function (henceforth, SCF) is robustly virtually implementable if
and only if it satisﬁes Δ-incentive compatibility and Δ-measurability.
The current paper aims at exploiting the implications of AKS by restrict-
ing attention to complete information environments, which have received a lot
of special attention in the literature. More speciﬁcally, I characterize a com-
plete information environment as Δ-restrictions on the set of ﬁrst-order beliefs.
Thus, this paper treats complete information environments in the same way as
it does incomplete information environments, while the implementation litera-
ture commonly treat these two environments in separate papers.2 This paper
1For surveys on implementation, see, for example, Jackson (2001) and Serrano (2004).
2Notable exceptions are A&M (1992b) and Mookherjee and Reichelstein (1992).
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oﬀers two main results. First, in complete information environments where
there are at least three agents, any SCF is robustly virtually implementable. In
fact, Abreu and Matsushima (A&M, henceforth, 1992a,b) already established
the same result but restricted their attention to a ﬁxed ﬁnite type space. So, I
show that A&M’s (1992a) result is robust to how one ﬁxes the underlying type
space. Second, I show that permissive robust virtual implementation results
can be extended to nearby incomplete information environments. Since the
set of complete information environments is “non-generic” relative to the set
of all incomplete information environments, it is desirable to check whether
or not the implementation results are robust to a small amount of incomplete
information. This robustness question is answered in the aﬃrmative: when
there are at least three agents, any SCF is robustly virtually implementable
under almost complete information.
This exhibits a stark contrast with the implementation literature using re-
ﬁnements of Nash equilibrium. It is well known that almost any SCF is exactly
implementable using reﬁnements of Nash equilibrium. Despite these permis-
sive implementation results, Chung and Ely (2003) show that if a mechanism
implements a non-Maskin monotonic SCF in undominated Nash equilibrium,
there are a nearby incomplete information environment and an undominated
Bayesian Nash equilibrium that is “not” close to any of undominated Nash
equilibria.3 Maskin monotonicity is known to be a necessary condition for
Nash implementation (See Maskin (1999)) and it is quite demanding in some
contexts.4 Muller and Satterthwaite (1977) states that any onto, ex post ef-
ﬁcient SCF deﬁned on the domain of all strict preferences over a ﬁnite set of
alternatives is dictatorial if it satisﬁes Maskin monotonicity. Maskin (1999)
shows that with only two agents, this result extends to social choice corre-
spondences. Moreover, Aghion, Fudenberg, Holden, Kunimoto, and Tercieux
(2012, henceforth, AFHKT) show that (1) if an SCF is implementable in sub-
game perfect equilibrium by a Moore-Repullo mechanism, its unique subgame
perfect equilibrium cannot be approximated by “any” equilibrium in some
nearby incomplete information games 5 and (2) if a mechanism implements a
non-Maskin monotonic SCF in subgame perfect equilibrium, there are a nearby
incomplete information environment and a sequential equilibrium that is “not”
close to any subgame perfect equilibria.6
Both Chung and Ely (2003) and AFHKT (2012) essentially show that if
an SCF is Nash implementable, it is robustly implementable under almost
complete information. However, their robustness requirement is much weaker
than that adopted in this paper: these authors (i) ﬁx a ﬁnite type space
all the time; (ii) only perturb the common prior distribution over that ﬁxed
3Undominated (Bayesian) Nash equilibrium is a (Bayesian) Nash equilibrium in which no player
uses weakly dominated actions.
4See Section 6 for the deﬁnition of Maskin monotonicity.
5See AFHKT (2012) for the deﬁnition of Moore-Repullo mechanisms.
6Kunimoto (2010) proposes an even smaller class of perturbations than that of Chung and Ely
(2003) and AFHKT (2012) such that the undominated Nash equilibrium correspondence is always
guaranteed to have a closed graph in the limit of complete information.
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type space; and (iii) require that the equilibrium correspondence be nonempty
for any nearby environment and have a closed graph in the limit of complete
information. On the other hand, this paper adopts a type-free solution concept
– Δ-rationlizability – under complete information so that all the results of
this paper do not depend upon how the underlying type space is speciﬁed.
Moreover, this paper’s results do not depend upon whether agents possess prior
beliefs over the type space or those prior beliefs are common. Thus, virtual
implementation can be considered an appropriate approach if one insists on
both permissive implementation results and the robustness to almost complete
information.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, I introduce
the preliminary notation and deﬁnitions. In Section 3, I deﬁne a complete
information environment as an incomplete information environment with Δ
restrictions on the set of ﬁrst-order beliefs. I exploit the implications of nec-
essary conditions for robust virtual implementation in complete information
environments (Propositions 2 and 3). In Section 4, I provide a characterization
of robust virtual implementation in quasi-transferable environments with com-
plete information (Theorem 3 and Corollary 1). In Section 5, I show that there
is a precise sense in which all the permissive robust virtual implementation re-
sults are “robust” to the relaxation of the complete information environments
(Theorem 4 and Corollary 2). Section 6 concludes.
2 Preliminaries
Throughout the paper, I extensively follow the notation and setup of AKS
(2013a). I refer the reader to their paper for most concepts discussed here.
Let N = {1, . . . , n} denote the set of agents and Θi be the set of ﬁnite payoﬀ-
relevant (or, simply, payoﬀ ) types of agent i. Denote Θ ≡ Θ1 × · · · ×Θn, and
Θ−i ≡ Θ1 × · · · ×Θi−1 × Θi+1 × · · · ×Θn.7 Let qi(θ−i) denote agent i’s ﬁrst-
order belief that other agents receive the proﬁle of payoﬀ types θ−i. For each
θi ∈ Θi, let Qi[θi] ⊆ Δ(Θ−i) be the (nonempty) set of admissible ﬁrst-order
beliefs of agent i of payoﬀ type θi. A pair (θi, qi) is called agent i’s ﬁrst-order
type.
Let A denote the set of pure outcomes, which are assumed to be indepen-
dent of the information state. Suppose A = {a1, . . . , aK} is ﬁnite. Let Δ(A)
denote the set of probability distributions on A. Agent i’s state dependent von
Neumann-Morgenstern utility function is denoted ui : Δ(A)×Θ → R.
I can now deﬁne an environment as E = (A, {ui,Θi, (Qi[θi])θi∈Θi}i∈N ),
which is implicitly understood to be common knowledge among the agents.
AKS assume Qi[θi] is deﬁned uniformly over all payoﬀ types θi and denote it
by Qi. Bergemann and Morris (2009, henceforth, B&M) not only consider the
case that the set of ﬁrst-order beliefs is uniform across payoﬀ types but also
assume the unrestricted set of ﬁrst-order belief, Qi = Δ(Θ−i) for every agent
7Similar notation will be used for products of other sets.
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i ∈ N . The reason why AKS and B&M assume this uniformity is that this
assumption makes it very diﬃcult for the planner to elicit the agents’ payoﬀ
types from their ﬁrst-order beliefs and by this assumption, one can obtain
robust implementation as a result. On the contrary, as I argue in the next
section, this paper needs to assume that the set of ﬁrst-order beliefs must
depend upon its’ payoﬀ types to take care of the case of complete information.
Throughout the paper, I impose the following assumption on environments:
Definition 1 (Quasi-Transferability) An environment E satisﬁes quasi-
transferability if there exists a collection of lotteries {a¯i}i∈N and {ai}i∈N in
Δ(A) such that for any θ ∈ Θ,
1. ui(a¯i; θ) > ui(ai; θ) for any i ∈ N ;
2. ui(aj ; θ) ≥ ui(a¯j ; θ) for any i, j ∈ N with i = j.
Remark: This assumption allows the agents to (partially) transfer their
utilities among them. By making this assumption, I essentially postulate
that A includes a numeraire, which can be transferred across agents. Quasi-
transferability is by no means innocuous and I will discuss some implications
of this assumption in Section 6.3. In what follows, I will make it clear wherever
I don’t need this assumption.
A social choice function (SCF) is a function f : Θ→ Δ(A). Note that the
domain of the SCFs is the “payoﬀ” type space. Deﬁne Vi(f ; θ
′
i|θi, qi) to be the
interim expected utility of agent i of ﬁrst-order type (θi, qi) that pretends to
be of payoﬀ type θ
′
i corresponding to an SCF f as follows:
8
Vi(f ; θ
′
i|θi, qi) =
∑
θ−i∈Θ−i
qi(θ−i)ui(f(θ
′
i, θ−i); θi, θ−i)
where θi, θ
′
i ∈ Θi and qi ∈ Qi[θi]. Denote Vi(f |θi, qi) = Vi(f ; θi|θi, qi).
A mechanism Γ = ((Mi)i∈N , g) describes a (nonempty) ﬁnite message space
Mi for each agent i and an outcome function g : M → Δ(A), where M =
×i∈NMi.9
Next I deﬁne a message correspondence proﬁle S = (S1, . . . , Sn) where for
each i ∈ N ,
Si : Θi → 2Mi ,
and I write S for the collection of message correspondence proﬁles. The col-
lection S is a lattice with the natural ordering of set inclusion: S ⊆ S′ if
Si(θi) ⊆ S′i(θi) for all i ∈ N and θi ∈ Θi. The largest element is S¯ =
8Note how, since the SCF does not depend on ﬁrst-order beliefs, the misrepresentation of qi into
q′i is of no consequence.
9The implementation literature often uses inﬁnite message spaces. However, as long as quasi-
transferability is assumed, the restriction to ﬁnite mechanisms can be made without loss of generality
in this paper.
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(S¯1, . . . , S¯n), where S¯i(θi) = Mi for all i ∈ N and θi ∈ Θi. The smallest
element is S = (S1, . . . , Sn), where Si(θi) = ∅ for all i ∈ N and θi ∈ Θi.
I deﬁne an operator b = (b1, . . . , bn) to iteratively eliminate never best re-
sponses. To this end, I denote the belief of agent i over message and payoﬀ type
proﬁles of the remaining agents by μi ∈ Δ(Θ−i ×M−i). Most importantly, I
introduce some restrictions on agents’ ﬁrst-order beliefs. For any qi ∈ Δ(Θ−i),
deﬁne
Δqi(Θ−i ×M−i) ≡ {μi ∈ Δ(Θ−i ×M−i)| margΘ−iμi = qi},
where margΘ−iμi(θ−i) ≡
∑
m−i μi(θ−i,m−i) for each θ−i ∈ Θ−i. The operator
b : S → S is now deﬁned as follows: for each i ∈ N and θi ∈ Θi,
bi(S)[θi] ≡
⎧⎨
⎩mi
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∃qi ∈ Qi[θi] ∃μi ∈ Δqi(Θ−i ×M−i) s.t.
μi(θ−i,m−i) > 0 ⇒ mj ∈ Sj(θj) ∀j = i; and
mi ∈ argmaxm′i∈Mi
∑
θ−i,m−i μi(θ−i,m−i)ui(g(m
′
i,m−i); θi, θ−i)
⎫⎬
⎭
This is an incomplete information version of rationalizability, proposed by
Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2003). They call it Δ-rationalizability and denote
by Δ restrictions on the set of ﬁrst-order beliefs Qi[θi]. I observe that b is
increasing by deﬁnition: S ≤ S′ ⇒ b(S) ≤ b(S′). By Tarski’s ﬁxed point
theorem, there is a largest ﬁxed point of b, which I label SΓ. Thus, I have that
(i) b(SΓ) = SΓ and (ii) b(S) = S ⇒ S ≤ SΓ. Since the mechanism is ﬁnite, I
can deﬁne
SΓi (θi) ≡
⋂
k≥1
bi(bk(S¯))[θi] = ∅,
Thus SΓi (θi) are the set of messages surviving iterated deletion of never best
responses; equivalently, SΓi (θi) is the set of messages that player i with pay-
oﬀ type θi might send consistent with common certainty of rationality, but
with some restrictions on the ﬁrst-order beliefs. Note that, since the mes-
sage space M is ﬁnite, SΓi (θi) = ∅; it is also unique. I refer to SΓi (θi) as the
Δ-rationalizable messages of payoﬀ type θi of agent i in mechanism Γ.
Write ‖y− y′‖ for the rectilinear norm between a pair of lotteries y and y′,
i.e.,
‖y − y′‖ ≡
∑
a∈A
|y(a)− y′(a)|,
where y(a) and y′(a) each denotes the probability that outcome a is realized.
The following is the deﬁnition of robust virtual implementation.
Definition 2 (Robust Virtual Implementation) An SCF f is robustly
virtually implementable if, for any ε > 0, there exists a mechanism Γε =
(M ε, gε) for which for any θ ∈ Θ and m ∈ M ε,
SΓ
ε
(θ) = ∅ and m ∈ SΓε(θ)⇒ ‖gε(m)− f(θ)‖ ≤ ε.
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3 Complete Information
This section and the next section focus on complete information environments,
which are a special class of incomplete information environments.
Definition 3 (Complete Information) E∗ = (A, (Θi, (Q∗i [θi])θi∈Θi , ui)i∈N )
is said to be a complete information environment if there exists a set Θ0
with the following two conditions:
1. for each agent i ∈ N , there exists a bijective map φi : Θi → Θ0; and
2. for each i ∈ N, θi ∈ Θi, qi ∈ Q∗i [θi], and θ−i ∈ Θ−i,
qi(θ−i) =
{
1 if φj(θj) = φi(θi) for each j = i
0 otherwise
Therefore, I can now easily characterize complete information as restric-
tions on the set of ﬁrst-order beliefs. This also justiﬁes including the set of
ﬁrst-order beliefs as part of the environment. In what follows, I denote by E∗
a complete information environment satisfying quasi-transferability.
Recall that A = {a1, . . . , aK} is the ﬁnite set of alternatives. Henceforth,
I ﬁnd it convenient to identify a lottery x ∈ Δ(A) as a point in the (K −
1) dimensional unit simplex ΔK−1 = {(x1, . . . , xK) ∈ RK+ |
∑K
k=1 xk = 1}.
Deﬁne V ki (θi, qi) to be the interim utility of agent i of ﬁrst-order type (θi, qi) ∈
Θi ×Qi[θi] for the constant SCF that assigns ak in each state in Θ, i.e.,
V ki (θi, qi) =
∑
θ−i∈Θ−i
qi(θ−i)ui(ak; θi, θ−i).
Since the payoﬀ proﬁle is common knowledge in a complete information en-
vironment E∗, θi’s ﬁrst-order belief qi is not needed for the expression for
V ki (θi, qi). This is very diﬀerent from the incomplete information counterpart
where AKS need to elicit each agent’s ﬁrst-order belief as part of message as
well as his payoﬀ type. In what follows, I write V ki (θi) for this:
V ki (θi) = ui(ak; θi, φ
−1
−i (θ0)),
where φ−1−i (θ0) = (φ
−1
1 (θ0), . . . , φ
−1
i−1(θ0), φ
−1
i+1(θ0), . . . , φ
−1
n (θ0)) and θ0 = φi(θi) ∈
Θ0. Let Vi(θi) = (V 1i (θi), . . . , V
K
i (θi)).
Throughout the paper, I take for granted that in complete information
environments, any pair of distinct payoﬀ proﬁles induces distinct (cardinal)
preferences over the set of lotteries, at least for some agent. Formally, I assume
the following.
Definition 4 A complete information environment E∗ is non-redundant if
there do not exist θ0, θ
′
0 ∈ Θ0 with θ0 = θ
′
0 such that for all i ∈ N , there exist
βi > 0 and γi ∈ R for which:
Vi(φ−1i (θ0)) = βiVi(φ
−1
i (θ
′
0)) + γie,
where e is the unit vector in RK .
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Remark: Given the very nature of the deﬁnition of the payoﬀ type space,
this assumption is innocuous. One needs an ordinal version of this domain
restriction for virtual Nash implementation of Abreu and Sen (1991) as well.10
Deﬁne Θ∗ = {θ ∈ Θ| φ1(θ1) = · · · = φn(θn) ∈ Θ0} as the subset of the
payoﬀ type space in which each agent receives the “same” signal. The concern
for implementation should be only on the set Θ∗ because any state outside of
Θ∗ is supposed not to be realized under complete information. This leads to
the use of the following concept: two SCFs f and h are said to be equivalent if
f(θ) = h(θ) for every θ ∈ Θ∗.11 Let f ≈ h denote that f and h are equivalent.
3.1 Incentive Compatibility
The following is the standard interim incentive compatibility condition applied
to the set of ﬁrst-order beliefs Qi[θi]:
Definition 5 (Δ-Incentive Compatibility) An SCF f : Θ → Δ(A) satis-
ﬁes Δ-incentive compatibility if for every i ∈ N, θi ∈ Θi, θ′i ∈ Θi, and
qi ∈ Qi[θi],
Vi(f |θi, qi) ≥ Vi(f ; θ′i|θi, qi)
AKS identify Δ-incentive compatibility as a necessary condition for robust
virtual implementability:
Proposition 1 (AKS) If an SCF is robustly virtually implementable, then it
satisﬁes Δ-incentive compatibility.
The next proposition formalizes the usual argument in the implementation
literature under complete information: when there are at least three agents,
incentive compatibility becomes a vacuous constraint.
Proposition 2 (A&M (1992b)) Let E∗ be a complete information environ-
ment where there are at least three agents. Then, for any SCF f , there exists
an SCF fˆ ≈ f such that fˆ satisﬁes Δ-incentive compatibility.
Remark: This result does not depend upon quasi-transferability.
Proof : The reader is referred to Section 6 of A&M (1992b).
3.2 Measurability
In an important paper, A&M (1992b) uncover a condition that they call mea-
surability (I shall refer to it as A&M measurability) that is necessary for virtual
10See Section 3.1 of Abreu and Sen (1991) for the detail.
11See Jackson (1991) for the argument on equivalent SCFs.
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implementation in iteratively undominated strategies over a standard environ-
ment that ﬁxes a Bayesian type space.12 AKS adapt A&M measurability to
their robust virtual implementation and show that a version of measurability,
called Δ-measurability, is also a necessary condition for “robust” virtual imple-
mentation. This section exploits the implication of Δ-measurability condition
imposed on a complete information environment E∗.
Denote by Ψi a partition of the set of payoﬀ types Θi, where ψi is a generic
element of Ψi and Ψi(θi) denotes the element of Ψi that includes payoﬀ type
θi. Let Ψ = ×i∈NΨi and ψ = ×i∈Nψi.
Definition 6 An SCF f is measurable with respect to Ψ if, for every
i ∈ N and every θi, θ′i ∈ Θi with θi = θ′i, whenever Ψi(θi) = Ψi(θ′i),
f(θi, θ−i) = f(θ′i, θ−i) ∀θ−i ∈ Θ−i.
Measurability of f with respect to Ψ implies that for any agent i, f does
not distinguish between any pair of payoﬀ types that lie in the same cell of the
partition Ψi.
I can now provide the deﬁnition of equivalent payoﬀ types. Note that,
since agent i ∈ N distinguishes all his payoﬀ types, I consider a partition
Θi ×Ψ−i ≡ {{θi}θi∈Θi} ×Ψ−i in that deﬁnition.
Definition 7 For every i ∈ N, θi, θ′i ∈ Θi with θi = θ′i, and (n − 1) tuple of
partitions Ψ−i, we say that θi is equivalent to θ′i (denoted by θi ∼ θ
′
i) with
respect to Ψ−i if, for any pair of SCFs f and f˜ which are measurable with
respect to Θi ×Ψ−i,
Vi(f |θi) ≥ Vi(f˜ |θi)⇐⇒ Vi(f |θ′i) ≥ Vi(f˜ |θ′i).
Let ρi(θi,Ψ−i) be the set of all elements of Θi that are equivalent to θi with
respect to Ψ−i, and let
Ri(Ψ−i) = {ρi(θi,Ψ−i) ⊆ Θi| θi ∈ Θi} .
Note that Ri(Ψ−i) forms an equivalence class on Θi, that is, it constitutes a
partition of Θi. I deﬁne an inﬁnite sequence of n-tuples of partitions, {Ψh}∞h=0,
where Ψh = ×i∈NΨhi in the following way. For every i ∈ N ,
Ψ0i = {Θi},
and recursively, for every i ∈ N and every h ≥ 1,
Ψhi = Ri(Ψ
h−1
−i ).
12Iteratively undominated strategies is the set of strategies that survive the iterated deletion of
strictly dominated strategies. As long as ﬁnite mechanisms are considered, iteratively undominated
strategies are the same as rationalizable strategies.
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Note that for every h ≥ 0, Ψh+1i is the same as, or ﬁner than, Ψhi . Thus, we
have a partial order ≥ as Ψh+1i ≥ Ψhi . Deﬁne Ψ∗ as follows:
Ψ∗ ≡
∞∨
h=0
Ψh,
where
∨
denotes the join on {Ψh}∞h=0 associated with ≥. Since Θi is ﬁnite for
each agent i ∈ N , there exists a positive integer L such that Ψh = ΨL for any
h ≥ L. Now, I am ready to deﬁne Δ-measurability.
Definition 8 An SCF f satisﬁes Δ-measurability if it is measurable with
respect to Ψ∗.13
AKS show that Δ-measurability is a necessary condition for robust virtual
implementation:
Theorem 1 (AKS) If an SCF f is robustly virtually implementable, then it
satisﬁes Δ-measurability.
The next result shows that in complete information environments, Δ-
measurability is a vacuous constraint.
Proposition 3 (A&M (1992b)) Consider a complete information environ-
ment E∗. For any SCF f , there exists an SCF fˆ ≈ f such that fˆ satisﬁes
Δ-measurability.
Remark: This result does not depend upon quasi-transferability.
Proof : We can easily adapt here the proof of A&M (1992b, Section 6) and
therefore omit the proof.
4 A Characterization under Complete In-
formation
AKS provide a characterization of robust virtual implementation by means of
Δ-incentive compatibility and Δ-measurability.
Theorem 2 (AKS) An SCF f is robustly virtually implementable if and
only if it satisﬁes Δ-incentive compatibility and Δ-measurability.
Recall that I denote by E∗ a complete information environment satisfying
quasi-transferability. In what follows, I only focus on the ﬁrst and second
iteration of Δ-measurability algorithm. Recall that Ψhi denotes the partition
over Θi that is derived from the h-th iteration of Δ-measurability algorithm
and that Ψhi (θi) denotes an element of Ψ
h
i that includes payoﬀ type θi.
13See AKS for an intuitive exposition of Δ-measurability.
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I already show by Proposition 3 that Δ-measurability is a vacuous con-
straint in complete information environments. In addition, the next lemma
shows that one can construct an SCF x, which is measurable with respect to
Ψ2 and fully separates all payoﬀ types.
Lemma 1 Consider a complete information environment E∗. Then, there
exists an SCF x that is measurable with respect to Ψ2 with the following two
properties: (1) for each i ∈ N, θi ∈ Θi and ψ2i ∈ Ψ2i \Ψ2i (θi),
Vi(x; Ψ2i (θi)|θi) > Vi(x;ψ2i |θi);
and (2) for every θ, θ
′ ∈ Θ with θ = θ′, there exists i ∈ N ,
Vi
(
x; Ψ2i (θi)|θi
)
> Vi(x; Ψ2i (θ
′
i)|θi).
Proof : For each i ∈ N and h = 1, 2, let
F (Ψhi ×Ψh−1−i ) =
{
f : Θ→ A
∣∣∣ f is measurable with respect to Ψhi ×Ψh−1−i
}
be the set of “deterministic” SCFs that are measurable with respect to Ψhi ×
Ψh−1−i . Recall that A and Θ are ﬁnite. So, the functional space F (Ψ
h
i ×Ψh−1−i )
is ﬁnite as well. Let x¯hi : Θ → Δ(A) be a social choice function that assigns
equal probability to each element of F (Ψhi ×Ψh−1−i ). That is, for each θ ∈ Θ,
x¯hi (θ) =
1
Kh
f1(θ) + · · ·+ 1
Kh
fKh(θ),
where Kh denotes the cardinality of F (Ψhi × Ψh−1−i ). By construction, x¯hi is
measurable with respect to Ψhi × Ψh−1−i and, abusing notation, we can write
x¯hi (θ) = x¯
h
i (Ψ
h(θ)). Following Lemma D.1 of AKS (2013b), we obtain the
following: for every i ∈ N , there exists a collection of SCFs {xhi [ψhi ]}ψhi ∈Ψhi
that are measurable with respect to Ψhi × Ψh−1−i , close to x¯hi , such that for
every θi,∈ Θi and ψhi ∈ Ψhi \Ψhi (θi),
Vi(xhi [Ψ
h
i (θi)]|θi) > Vi(xhi [ψhi ]|θi).
Deﬁne an SCF x as follows: for each ψ2 ∈ Ψ2 with ψ2 ⊆ ψ1 ∈ Ψ1,
x(ψ2) =
1− δ
n
∑
i∈N
x1i [ψ
1
i ] +
δ
n
∑
i∈N
x2i [ψ
2
i ](ψ
2
i , ψ
1
−i),
where δ > 0 is determined later. By construction, the SCF x is measurable
with respect to Ψ2. It only remains to show that the SCF x satisﬁes the two
properties in the statement of the lemma. For every SCF y : Θ→ Δ(A), deﬁne
G(y) = max
i∈N
max
θ,θ′∈Θ
∣∣ui(y(θ′); θ)− ui(y(θi, θ′−i); θ)∣∣.
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Choose δ > 0 small enough such that
(1− δ) min
i∈N,θi∈Θi,ψhi =Ψhi (θi)
Vi(x1i [Ψ
h
i (θi)]|θi)− Vi(x1i [ψ1i ]|θi) > δ
∑
j∈N
G(x2j ).
Fix i ∈ N, θi ∈ Θi, and ψ2i ∈ Ψ2i \Ψ2i (θi). There are two cases we have to
consider. First, assume ψ1i /∈ Ψ1i (θi) where ψ2i ⊆ ψ1i . Then, due to the choice
of δ, we must have
Vi(x1i [Ψ
1
i (θi)]|θi) > Vi(x1i [ψ1i ]|θi)⇒ Vi(x; Ψ1i (θi)|θi) > Vi(x;ψ1i |θi).
Assume that ψ1i ∈ Ψ1i (θi) but ψ2i /∈ Ψ2i (θi). Then, due to the choice of δ, we
have
Vi(x1i [Ψ
1
i (θi)]|θi) = Vi(x1i [ψ1i ]|θi) and Vi(x2i [Ψ2i (θi)]|θi) > Vi(x2i [ψ2i ]|θi)
⇒ Vi(x; Ψ2i (θi)|θi) > Vi(x;ψ2i |θi).
Hence, inequality (1) holds. It is easy to see that the non-redundancy condition
guarantees that inequality (2) holds.
I am now ready to state and prove the main result of this section:
Theorem 3 (Characterization under Complete Information) Consider
a complete information environment E∗. An SCF f satisﬁes Δ-incentive com-
patibility if and only if there exists an SCF fˆ ≈ f such that fˆ is robustly
virtually implementable.
Remark: The proof is essentially an adaptation of the proof of Theorem 4 of
AKS to the complete information environments. The most important fact of
which this paper makes use is that the implementing mechanism is ﬁnite.
Proof : By Theorem 1, we know that Δ-incentive compatibility is nec-
essary for robust virtual implementation. So, we focus on the suﬃciency
part. Suppose f satisﬁes Δ-incentive compatibility. By the same argument
of Proposition 3, we can construct an SCF fˆ ≈ f such that fˆ both satis-
ﬁes Δ-incentive compatibility and Δ-measurability. The rest of the proof is
essentially a straightforward modiﬁcation of the proof of Theorem 4 of AKS
(2013a,b). The only modiﬁcation we have to make there is that (1) each agent
i’s message space only consists of J repetition of i’s “payoﬀ” type space, i.e.,
Mi = (Θi)J , while the message space of AKS also contain the announcement
of ﬁrst-order beliefs; and (2) we need to replace Lemma D.1 (AKS (2013b))
with Lemma 1 of the current paper to use it as the separation term of the
outcome function.
Finally, I conclude this section with a permissive implementation result.
Corollary 1 Let E∗ be a complete information environment where there are
at least three agents. Then, for any SCF f , there exists an SCF fˆ ≈ f such
that fˆ is robustly virtually implementable.
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Remark: When there are only two agents, Δ-incentive compatibility can be
shown to be equivalent to the intersection property (Abreu and Sen (1991)). I
refer the reader to A&M (1992b, Section 6) for this equivalence. This condition
says that whenever two agents disagree about the state, there is a lottery that
is (weakly) worse than the social choice for both agents, whichever the true
state is.14 Unfortunately, quasi-transferability does not help us weaken the re-
quirement of Δ-incentive compatibility. Hence, robust virtual implementation
is much more restrictive for the case of two agents.
Proof : This directly follows from Theorem 3 and Proposition 2.
This corollary signiﬁcantly extends the main result of A&M (1992a). As
I explain in the fourth paragraph of the introduction, A&M (1992a) ﬁx a
ﬁnite type space. Indeed, this corollary shows that A&M’s main result holds
irrespective of how one speciﬁes a type space. Moreover, it is a reﬁnement
of the main result of Abreu and Sen (1991), provided that one assumes the
expected utility hypothesis and quasi-transferability. See Section 6.2 for more
details.
5 A Characterization under Almost Com-
plete Information
Until the previous section, I have ﬁxed a complete information environment
E∗ throughout. Since the set of complete information environments is “non-
generic” relative to the set of all incomplete information environments, the
permissive nature of robust virtual implementation might crucially rely on
the complete information assumption. Thus, I ask the following robustness
question: are the results robust to the relaxation of the complete information
assumption? This question cannot be answered by AKS because AKS have to
ﬁx the set of ﬁrst-order beliefs Qi[θi] throughout, while the current paper wants
to perturb this very set. In answering this question, I am motivated by (but do
not exactly follow) the robust equilibrium analysis, which is ﬁrst proposed by
Kajii and Morris (1997) and later generalized by Oyama and Tercieux (2010)
who extend its analysis to the non-common priors environments.
5.1 Type Space
In the rest of the paper, if X is a topological space, I treat it as a measur-
able space with its Borel σ-algebra and I denote by Δ(X) the space of Borel
probability measures on X. If X is countable, it is treated as a topological
space endowed with the discrete topology. Moreover, if X and Y are Borel
14Formally, an SCF f satisﬁes the intersection property if, for any θ, θ
′ ∈ Θ∗, there exists a
lottery z(θ, θ
′
) ∈ Δ(A) such that u1(f(θ′); θ′) ≥ u1(z(θ, θ′); θ′) and u2(f(θ); θ) ≥ u2(z(θ, θ′); θ).
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measurable spaces, a product space X × Y is equipped with the associated
product topology and product Borel σ-algebra.
When the robustness with respect to nearby incomplete information is the
issue, I need a framework that allows for the perturbations of the complete
information environments. I propose a type space as such a framework that
accommodates nearby incomplete information environments:
Definition 9 A type space is a tuple T ≡ (Ti, θˆi, qˆi, πi)i∈N where for each
player i ∈ N ,
1. Ti is a countable space;
2. θˆi : Ti → Θi is an onto (or surjective) mapping15;
3. qˆi : Ti → Δ(Θ−i); and
4. πi : Ti → Δ(T−i).
I denote a type of agent i by τi and the agent i’s countable set of types
by Ti.16 A type τi of agent i must include a description of his payoﬀ type and
ﬁrst-order belief. Thus, θˆi(τi) is agent i’s payoﬀ type when his type is τi and
qˆi[τi] is the ﬁrst-order belief of agent i of type τi. πi[τi] denotes the belief of
agent i of type τi about the types of all other agents.
The next concept of coherence allows the complete information environ-
ment to be embedded into a type space.
Definition 10 A type space T = (Ti, θˆi, qˆi, πi)i∈N is coherent with an envi-
ronment E = (A, (Θi, (Qi[θi])θi∈Θi , ui)i∈N ) if, for each i ∈ N and τi ∈ Ti, the
marginal of πi[τi] on Θ−i through θˆ−i is qˆi[τi] which is an element in Qi[θˆi(τi)]:
for any i ∈ N , τi ∈ Ti, and θ−i ∈ Θ−i,
∑
τ−i:θˆ−i(τ−i)=θ−i
πi[τi](τ−i) = qˆi[τi](θ−i).
Recall that E∗ denotes a complete information environment satisfying quasi-
transferability. A type space T ∗ = (T ∗i , θˆ∗i , qˆ∗i , π∗i )i∈N is said to be a complete
information structure if it is coherent with E∗. Fix a mechanism Γ = (M, g)
throughout this section unless mentioned otherwise. Moreover, let Γ(T ∗) de-
note a complete information game associated with T ∗.
5.2 Rationalizability under a Type Space T
In a type space T = (Ti, θˆi, qˆi, πi)i∈N and a mechanism Γ = (M, g), I deﬁne
agent i’s message correspondence ST = (ST1 , . . . , STn ) where for each i ∈ N ,
STi : Ti → 2Mi .
15This guarantees that the type space is at least as large as the payoﬀ type space.
16I could extend the analysis to more general spaces, but at the cost of additional technical
complexity.
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and I write ST for the collection of message correspondence proﬁles of the
game Γ(T ) with the natural set-inclusion order.
I deﬁne an operator b = (b1, . . . , bn) to iteratively eliminate never best
responses. The operator b : ST → ST is now deﬁned as follows: for any
i ∈ N, τi ∈ Ti,
bi(ST )[τi] ≡
⎧⎨
⎩mi
∣∣∣∣∣
∃μi ∈ Δ(T−i ×M−i) s.t.
μi(θ−i,m−i) > 0 ⇒ mj ∈ STj (τj) ∀j = i; and
mi ∈ argmaxm′i∈Mi
∑
τ−i,m−i μi(τ−i,m−i)ui(g(m
′
i,m−i); θˆ(τi, τ−i))
⎫⎬
⎭
Since the message space is ﬁnite, I have that for each i ∈ N and τi ∈ Ti,
S
Γ(T )
i (τi) ≡
⋂
k≥1
bi(bk(S¯))[τi] = ∅.
Thus SΓ(T )i (τi) are the set of messages surviving iterated deletion of never best
responses; equivalently, SΓ(T )i (τi) is the set of messages that player i with type
τi might send consistent with common certainty of rationality.
The interim expected utility of agent i of type τi that pretends to be of
type τ ′i corresponding to an SCF f is deﬁned as:
Ui(f ; τ ′i |τi) ≡
∑
θ−i
qˆi[τi](θ−i)ui(f(θˆi(τ ′i), θ−i); θˆi(τi), θ−i)
Denote Ui(f |τi) = Ui(f ; τi|τi). For θi = θˆi(τi), θ′i = θˆi(τ
′
i ), and qi = qˆi[τi], I
have
Vi(f ; θ
′
i|θi, qi) = Ui(f ; τ
′
i |τi).
Therefore, I obtain the following equivalence between Δ-rationalizability under
complete information and rationlaizability under a type space T ∗ = (T ∗i , θˆ∗i , qˆ∗i , πi)i∈N :
for any τ ∈ T ∗,
SΓ(θˆ∗(τ)) = SΓ(T
∗)(τ).
Hence, as far as one is concerned with rationalizability under complete infor-
mation, each agent’s behavior does not depend upon how the underlying type
space T ∗ is described. This is exactly the point exempliﬁed by Corollary 1.
5.3 The Robustness to Almost Complete Informa-
tion
Fix a type space T = (Ti, θˆi, qˆi, πi)i∈N . For each measurable E−i ⊆ T−i, deﬁne
the p-belief operator for agent i, Bpi : 2
T−i → 2Ti , is deﬁned by
Bpi (E−i) =
{
τi ∈ Ti
∣∣∣∣ πi[τi](E−i) ≥ p
}
,
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where πi[τi](E−i) ≡
∑
τ−i∈E−i πi[τi](τ−i). That is, B
p
i (E−i) is the set of types
of agent i where he believes with probability at least p that event E−i is true.
Let Bp∗(E) = E ∩ ×i∈NBpi (E−i) = E ∩ {τ ∈ T | πi[τi](E−i) ≥ p ∀i ∈ N} be
the set of states where event E is indeed true and every agent believes with
probability at least p that event E is true. At a state τ , an event E is mutual
p-believed at order L if τ ∈ ⋂L=1[Bp∗ ](E), where [Bp∗ ](·) is deﬁned recursively
by [Bp∗ ](E) = B
p
∗([B
p
∗ ]−1(E)) for every  ≥ 1. Finally, at state τ , an event E
is common p-believed if τ ∈ ⋂∞=0[Bp∗ ](E).
In what follows, for two type spaces T = (Ti, θˆi, qˆi, πi)i∈N and T ′ =
(T ′i , θˆ
′
i, qˆ
′
i, π
′
i)i∈N , I say T ⊇ T
′
if, σ-algebra on each T ′i is the relative σ-
algebra obtained from each Ti, and for all i ∈ N and τi ∈ T ′i :
πi[τi](E−i) = π
′
i[τi](T
′
−i ∩ E−i) for any measurable E−i ⊆ T−i.
Now, I introduce a class of perturbations of the complete information structure
used for this paper:
Definition 11 A type space T ∗[η, L] is an (η, L)-perturbation of T ∗ if T ∗[η, L] ⊇
T ∗ and for all i ∈ N and all τi ∈ T ∗i ,
πi[τi] (E−i) ≥ 1− η,
where E ≡ ⋂L=1[B1−η∗ ] (T ∗) ⊆ T ∗[η, L], which denotes the set of all states in
which T ∗ is mutually (1−η)-believed at order L. Such a perturbation is denoted
T ∗[η, L] ⊇ T ∗ and Γ(T ∗[η, L]) is called a (nearby) incomplete information
game.
Remark: This perturbation is diﬀerent from those considered by Kajii and
Morris (1997) and Oyama and Tercieux (2010) because they take the approx-
imation of outcome distributions from the ex ante point of view and include
“crazy types,” each of which exhibits distinct preferences in the perturbations,
hence much richer perturbations. In this paper, I perturb only the set of
ﬁrst-order beliefs Q∗i [θi] within the richer embedding space and take the ap-
proximation of outcome distributions from the ex post point of view. Indeed,
this follows and generalizes the robustness approach by Chung and Ely (2003)
and Kunimoto (2010) who discuss the robustness of undominated Nash im-
plementation and by AFHKT (2012) who discuss the robustness of subgame
perfect implementation. However, this paper’s robustness analysis is much
more demanding than these papers because these authors have to ﬁx a ﬁnite
type space all the time, while this paper allows for all countable (both ﬁnite
and countably inﬁnite) type spaces. This perturbation is also diﬀerent from
that of Oury and Tercieux (2012). They instead consider the perturbation in
terms of the product topology of weak convergence of inﬁnite hierarchies of
probabilistic beliefs (as I describe in the second paragraph of the Introduction)
in the universal type space.17 This is a much richer perturbation than that
17See Oury and Tercieux (2012) for the construction of the universal type space.
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of this paper. However, if one is only concerned with partial implementation,
this richer perturbation suﬃces. The reason why I need a smaller class of
perturbations is that I am concerned with full implementation that is robust
to almost complete information.
I introduce the deﬁnition of robust virtual implementation under almost
complete information:
Definition 12 An SCF f is robustly virtually implementable under almost
complete information if, for any ε > 0, there exist η¯ > 0, L ≥ 1, and a
mechanism Γ = (M, g) such that for each η ∈ (0, η¯), L ≥ L, T ∗[η, L] ⊇ T ∗,
τ ∈ T ∗, and m ∈ M ,
SΓ(T
∗[η,L])(τ) = ∅ and m ∈ SΓ(T ∗[η,L])(τ)⇒ ‖g(m)− f(θˆ∗(τ))‖ ≤ ε.
Remark: I can also deﬁne robust implementation under almost complete
information for other solution concepts. I will elaborate on this in Section 6.1.
Theorem 4 (Characterization under “Almost” Complete Information)
An SCF f satisﬁes Δ-incentive compatibility if and only if there exists an SCF
fˆ ≈ f such that fˆ is robustly virtually implementable under almost complete
information.
Proof : We have already shown by Theorem 1 that Δ-incentive compatibil-
ity is a necessary condition for robust virtual implementation under complete
information. This must continue to be the case under almost complete infor-
mation. Thus, we focus on the suﬃciency part. Since f satisﬁes Δ-incentive
compatibility, by Theorem 3, there exists an SCF fˆ ≈ f such that fˆ is robustly
virtually implementable under complete information. Moreover, this is so by
a “ﬁnite” mechanism.
Fix an arbitrarily small ε > 0. By the previous argument, we can ﬁx a ﬁnite
implementing mechanism Γ = (M, g) with the property that for any θ ∈ Θ∗
and any m ∈ M ,
SΓ(θ) = ∅ and m ∈ SΓ(θ) ⇒ ‖g(m)− fˆ(θ)‖ ≤ ε/2.
This also implies that for any complete information structure T ∗ = (T ∗i , θˆ∗i , qˆ∗i , π∗i )i∈N ,
τ ∈ T ∗, and m ∈ M ,
SΓ(T
∗)(τ) = ∅ and m ∈ SΓ(T ∗)(τ)⇒ ‖g(m)− fˆ(θˆ∗(τ))‖ ≤ ε/2.
Recall that we write S for the collection of message correspondence proﬁles
and it is a lattice with the natural ordering of set inclusion. For each η > 0,
we deﬁne on operator bη : S → S as follows: for each i ∈ N and each θi ∈ Θi,
bηi (S)[θi] ≡
⎧⎨
⎩mi
∣∣∣∣∣
∃qi ∈ Q∗i [θi] ∃μi ∈ Δqi(Θ−i ×M−i) s.t.
μi(θ−i,m−i) > 0⇒ mj ∈ Sj(θj) ∀j = i; and
mi ∈ argmaxm′i
∑
θ−i,m−i μi(θ−i,m−i)ui(g(m
′
i,m−i); θi, θ−i)− ηu¯
⎫⎬
⎭ ,
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where u¯ ≡ maxi∈N maxθ∈Θ maxm∈M ui(g(m); θ). Since the mechanism Γ is
ﬁnite, the iterated deletion of never best responses stops at a ﬁnite number.
Call such a number L. Moreover, by the ﬁniteness of Γ and Θ and the conti-
nuity of expected utility, for each  ∈ {1, . . . , L}, one can choose η > 0 small
enough so that for each i ∈ N and θi ∈ Θi,
⋂
k=1
bi(bk(S¯))[θi] =
⋂
k=1
b
η+1
i (b
k,ηk)(S¯)[θi].
This means that, due to the ﬁniteness of Γ and Θ, never best responses under
complete information continue to be so even under a small payoﬀ perturbation.
Deﬁne η′ = min{η1, . . . , ηL}. Fix any type space T ∗[η′, L], which is an
(η′, L)-perturbation of T ∗. Then, for any τ ∈ T ∗, we have
τ ∈
L⋂
=1
[B1−η
′
∗ ]
(T ∗)⇒ SΓ(T ∗[η′,L])(τ) = SΓ(T ∗)(τ) = SΓ(θˆ∗(τ)).
where
⋂L
=1[B
1−η′
∗ ](T ∗) ⊆ T ∗[η′, L]. Since T ∗[η′, L] is an (η′, L)-perturbation
of T ∗, we have that for each i ∈ N and τi ∈ T ∗i ,
π
η′,L
i [τi](E−i) ≥ 1− η′,
where E ≡ ⋂L=1[B1−η′∗ ](T ∗) ⊆ T ∗[η′, L] = (T η′,Li , θˆη′,Li , qˆη′,Li , πη′,Li )i∈N . By
the ﬁniteness of Γ and the continuity of expected utility, we can choose η′′ ∈
(0, η′] small enough so that for each τ ∈ T ∗ and m ∈ M ,
m ∈ SΓ(T ∗)(τ)⇒ m ∈ SΓ(T ∗[η′′,L])(τ).
This implies that for each τ ∈ T ∗ and T ∗[η′′ , L],
SΓ(T
∗)(τ) = ∅ ⇒ SΓ(T ∗[η′′,L])(τ) = ∅.
Moreover, by the continuity of expected utility, one can easily see that for any
η ∈ (0, η′′] and L ≥ L,
SΓ(T
∗[η′′,L])(τ) = ∅ ⇒ SΓ(T ∗[η,L])(τ) = ∅.
In sum, we have that for any η ∈ (0, η′′], L ≥ L, T ∗[η, L], and τ ∈ T ∗,
SΓ(T
∗[η,L])(τ) = ∅.
So, the message correspondence is guaranteed to be nonempty for any nearby
type space.
At any state τ ∈ T ∗, all agents believe with probability at least (1 − η′′)
that event E is true, i.e., SΓ(T ∗[η′′,L])(τ) = SΓ(T ∗)(τ). This implies that the
probability of event E being true is at least (1−η′′). Therefore, we can choose
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η¯ = min{ε/2, η′′} such that for any τ ∈ T ∗, T ∗[η¯, L] ⊇ T ∗, m ∈ SΓ(T ∗[η¯,L])(τ),
and m∗ ∈ SΓ(T ∗)(τ),
‖g(m)− g(m∗)‖ ≤ η¯a¯ = η¯ ≤ ε/2,
where a¯ ≡ supα,α′∈Δ(A) ‖α− α′‖ = 1.18
Furthermore, for any τ ∈ T ∗, η ∈ (0, η¯], L ≥ L, m ∈ SΓ(T ∗[η,L])(τ), and
m∗ ∈ SΓ(T ∗)(τ), we have
‖g(m)− g(m∗)‖ ≤ η¯ ≤ ε/2.
Then, for any η ∈ (0, η¯), L ≥ L, τ ∈ T ∗, T ∗[η, L] ⊇ T ∗, m ∈ SΓ(T ∗[η,L])(τ),
and m∗ ∈ SΓ(T ∗)(τ), we have
‖g(m)− fˆ(θˆ∗(τ))‖ = ‖g(m)− g(m∗) + g(m∗)− fˆ(θˆ∗(τ)‖
≤ ‖g(m)− g(m∗)‖+ ‖g(m∗)− fˆ(θˆ∗(τ)‖ (∵ triangle inequality)
≤ ε/2 + ε/2 = ε.
Summarizing all the arguments thus far, we have that there exist η¯ > 0
and L ≥ 1 such that for each η ∈ (0, η¯], L ≥ L, T ∗[η, L] ⊇ T ∗, τ ∈ T ∗, and
m ∈ M ,
SΓ(T
∗[η,L])(τ) = ∅ and m ∈ SΓ(T ∗[η,L])(τ)⇒ ‖g(m)− fˆ(θˆ∗(τ))‖ ≤ ε.
This completes the proof.
The following corollary is the main result of this paper:
Corollary 2 Suppose that there are at least three agents. Then, for any SCF
f , there exists an SCF fˆ ≈ f such that fˆ is robustly virtually implementable
under almost complete information.
Proof : This directly follows from Theorem 4 and Proposition 2.
6 Concluding Remarks
In conclusion, I discuss some related papers and connect these papers to the
current paper.
18Recall that ‖α−α′‖ ≡∑a∈A |α(a)−α′(a)| and α(a) and α′(a) each denotes the probability that
pure outcome a is realized. Note also that the ﬁniteness of A is not essential here and moreover,
if A is a complete separable space, all the arguments go through by focusing on a countable dense
subset of it.
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6.1 Chung and Ely (2003) and Aghion, Fudenberg,
Holden, Kunimoto, and Tercieux (2012)
By requiring solution concepts to have a closed graph in the limit of complete
information in a ﬁxed ﬁnite type space, Chung and Ely (2003) and AFHKT
(2012) show that only Maskin monotonic social choice rules can be robustly im-
plementable under almost complete information. Here I provide the deﬁnition
of Maskin monotonicity:
Definition 13 An SCF f satisﬁes Maskin monotonicity if, for any of
states θ, θ′ ∈ Θ, whenever
∀i ∈ N, ∀b ∈ Δ(A) : ui(f(θ); θ) ≥ ui(b; θ)⇒ ui(f(θ); θ′) ≥ ui(b; θ′),
then f(θ) = f(θ′).
These authors’ robustness requirement is much weaker than that adopted
in this paper because the following three restrictions are imposed on the class
of perturbations: (i) L = ∞; (ii) T ∗[η,∞] = Θ for each η > 0; and (iii)
T ∗ = Θ∗.19 So, their robustness requires that one ﬁx a ﬁnite type space and
only perturb the prior beliefs over that ﬁxed type space. On the other hand,
this paper’s result remain intact regardless of what (potentially inﬁnite) type
spaces are considered.
AFHKT (2012) show that when there are at least three agents, if an SCF
f satisﬁes Maskin monotonicity and no-veto-power, there exists a mecha-
nism Γ = (M, g) such that (1) there exist a sequence of strategy proﬁles
{ση}η>0 and a sequence of beliefs {μη}η>0 with (ση, μη) ∈ SΓ(T ∗[η,∞]) such
that limη→0 g(ση(τ)) = f(θˆ∗(τ)) for each τ ∈ T ∗ and (2) for any (ση, μη) ∈
SΓ(T ∗[η,∞]), we have limη→0 g(ση(τ)) = f(θˆ∗(τ)) for each τ ∈ T ∗ where SΓ(T ∗[η,∞])
stands for either the undominated (Bayesian) Nash equilibrium correspondence
used by Chung and Ely (2003) or the subgame perfect (or sequential) equilib-
rium correspondence used by AFHKT (2012).20 Here, μη denotes the proﬁle
of all agents’ beliefs over the type space and the set of histories of the game.
When undominated Nash equilibrium is used, there is no need to include the
agent’s belief proﬁle μη as part of the equilibrium. This is needed for sequential
equilibrium.
At the same time, these authors also show that if a mechanism Γ = (M, g)
implements a non-Maskin monotonic SCF in either undominated Nash or sub-
game perfect equilibrium, there is a sequence of strategy proﬁles {ση}η>0 and
a sequence of belief proﬁles {μη}η>0 with (ση, μη) ∈ SΓ(T ∗[η,∞]) such that
limη→0 g(ση(τ)) = f(θˆ∗(τ)) for some τ ∈ T ∗. This implies that Maskin mono-
tonicity is a necessary condition for robust implementation under almost com-
plete information, regardless of whether one uses either undominated Nash or
subgame perfect equilibrium as a solution concept.
19Recall that Θ∗ = {θ ∈ Θ|φ1(θ1) = · · · = φn(θn) ∈ Θ0}.
20To be exact, this result needs one more condition, the no-worst-alternative condition (NWA).
See Online Appendix of AFHKT (2012) for the precise deﬁnitions of no-veto-power and NWA.
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6.2 Abreu and Sen (1991)
Abreu and Sen (1991) show that when there are at least three agents, any social
choice function is virtually implementable in Nash equilibrium. This paper
shows that A&M’s permissive virtual implementation results are robust to
how the underlying type space is ﬁxed, while Abreu and Sen’s is certainly not.
Nevertheless, this improvement comes at some cost. This paper’s suﬃciency
results need quasi-transferability, while Abreu and Sen do not need. While I
explicitly need the expected utility hypothesis, Abreu and Sen do not. They
instead require that individual preferences over lotteries be monotone in the
sense that any shift of probability weight from a less preferred to a more
preferred pure alternative yields a lottery which is preferred. The monotone
preferences are weaker than and implied by the expected utility representation.
6.3 Bo¨rgers (1995) and Kunimoto and Serrano (2011)
Quasi-transferability is the the single assumption on which this paper’s results
crucially rely. It is very natural to ask the extent to which the permissive re-
sults can be extended to more general environments. Bo¨rgers (1995) shows that
only dictatorial SCFs are “exactly” implementable in rationalizable strategies,
provided that all players could have all possible identical preferences over a ﬁ-
nite set of outcomes and only ﬁnite, deterministic mechanisms are considered.
This possibility, however, is explicitly avoided by quasi-transferability, which
excludes any possibility that all agents have identical preferences. Therefore,
one might attribute the permissive result of virtual implementation (at least
partly) to this domain restriction. Kunimoto and Serrano (2011) indeed con-
ﬁrm this point. They uncover a new necessary condition that implies that
quasi-transferability cannot be completely dispensed with for implementation
in rationalizable (iteratively undominated) strategies. They term the condi-
tion “restricted deception-proofness.” It requires that, in environments with
identical preferences, the SCF be immune to all deceptions, making it then
stronger than incentive compatibility. As I argue above, quasi-transferability
excludes the case that all agents have identical preferences. However, even if
one can exclude any possibility that all agents have identical preferences, there
might be some other conditions needed for general environments in character-
izing virtual implementation in rationalizable strategies. This is an interesting
open question and I leave it for the future work.
6.4 Oury and Tercieux (2012)
Oury and Tercieux (2012) is related to the current paper. They propose con-
tinuous implementation where the planner would like that, in any perturbation
of his initial model, there is some equilibrium that yields the desired outcome,
not only at types in the initial model, but also types that are close to it. What
they mean by “two types are close to each other” is that these two types are
close in the product topology of weak convergence of inﬁnite hierarchies of
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beliefs in the universal type space. They consider partial (as opposed to full)
Bayesian (resp., Nash) implementation under incomplete (resp., complete) in-
formation.21 Proposition 2 of their paper is one of their main results and is
the most relevant here: An SCF is continuously “partially” virtually imple-
mentable by a ﬁnite mechanism if and only if it is fully virtually implementable
in rationalizable strategies by a ﬁnite mechanism. Hence, in quasi-transferable
environments where there are at least three agents, any SCF is robustly virtu-
ally implementable under almost complete information and at the same time,
any SCF is virtually continuously implementable under complete information
by a ﬁnite mechanism.
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